The Russian plan of campaign
was quite different. The tsar knew his people, that they were deeply
religious and patriotic, that they hated Napoleon bitterly, and that
they could be trusted not to revolt. He likewise knew well the
character of the 800 miles of comparatively barren steppes that
intervened between the Niemen and Moscow, whereon small armies could be
beaten and large ones starved. Against the _Grande Armee_
therefore, Alexander directed that no decisive battle be risked, but
that the Russian forces, always retreating, should draw their opponents
on as far as possible into the interior of the country, where the
rigors and privations of a Russian winter could be expected to work
greater havoc among them than could powder and bullets.
To his surprise and uneasiness, therefore, Napoleon after crossing the
Niemen found the Russians always retreating before his advance. No
decisive victory could be won against the elusive foe. Nor was the
temper of the Lithuanians such as to encourage him to remain all winter
among them.
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