"
"And is not the converse of your proposition true also? In the
degree that we are just to ourselves, are we not just to others?"
"Undoubtedly. Each individual bears to common society, the same
relation that a member, organ, or fibre, does to the human body, of
which it makes a part. And as no member, organ, or fibre of the
body, can injure itself without injuring the whole man; so no
individual can do wrong to himself, without a consequent wrong to
others. Each has duties to perform for the good of common society,
and any self-inflicted or self-permitted disabilities that hinder
the right performance of these duties, involve a moral wrong."
"Then the case is very clear for my friend Wallingford," said I. "He
is a wise man in your sense of the word--wise, in resolutely putting
away from his mind the image of one who, if she had been worthy of
him, would have taken her place proudly by his side; but, proving
herself unworthy, could never afterward be to him more than a friend
or stringer. He could not hold her image in his heart, and fondly
regard it, without sin; for was she not to be the bride of another?
Nor without suffering loss of mental power, and life-purpose, and
thus injuring others trough neglect of duty.
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