Berkeley, George
"Three Dialogues Between Hylas And Philonous"
Right.
. Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one
part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth
thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of that
diversity of colours, yet that cause cannot be said to be a
sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of seeing?
. It doth.
. In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet
I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds?
. You cannot.
. And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot
and heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel
the cause of its heat or weight?
. To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell
you once for all, that by I mean those only
which are perceived by sense; and that in truth the senses
perceive nothing which they do not perceive : for
they make no {175} inferences. The deducing therefore of causes
or occasions from effects and appearances, which alone are
perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason.
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