Berkeley, George
"Three Dialogues Between Hylas And Philonous"
. I speak with regard to sensible things only. And of
these I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a
subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from their being
perceived?
. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and
without any relation to, their being perceived.
. Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must
exist without the mind?
. It must.
. Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally
compatible to all degrees of heat, which we perceive; or is there
any reason why we should attribute it to some, and deny it to
others? And if there be, pray let me know that reason.
. Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may
be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it.
. What! the greatest as well as the least?
. tell you, the reason is plainly the same in
respect of both. They are both perceived by sense; nay, the
greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived; and
consequently, if there is {176} any difference, we are more
certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a
lesser degree.
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