Berkeley, George
"Three Dialogues Between Hylas And Philonous"
I own it.
. Consequently the same body may to another seem to
perform its motion over any space in half the time that it doth
to you. And the same reasoning will hold as to any other
proportion: that is to say, according to your principles (since
the motions perceived are both really in the object) it is
possible one and the same body shall be really moved the same way
at once, both very swift and very slow. How is this consistent
either with common sense, or with what you just now granted?
{191}
. I have nothing to say to it.
. Then as for ; either you do not mean any
sensible quality by that word, and so it is beside our inquiry:
or if you do, it must be either hardness or resistance. But both
the one and the other are plainly relative to our senses: it
being evident that what seems hard to one animal may appear soft
to another, who hath greater force and firmness of limbs. Nor is
it less plain that the resistance I feel is not in the body.
. I own the very of resistance, which is
all you immediately perceive, is not in the body; but the
of that sensation is.
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