I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair
observation of what passes in my mind, I can discover nothing
else but that I am a thinking being, affected with variety of
sensations; neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation
should exist in an unperceiving substance. But then, on the other
hand, when I look on sensible things in a different view,
considering them as so many modes and qualities, I find it
necessary to suppose a
, without which they
cannot be conceived to exist.
. call you it? Pray, by which of
your senses came you acquainted with that being?
. It is not itself sensible; its modes and qualities
only being perceived by the senses.
. I presume then it was by reflexion and reason you
obtained
the idea of it?
. I do not pretend to any proper positive of it.
However, I conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be
conceived to exist without a support.
. It seems then you have only a relative of
it, or that you conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving the
relation it bears to sensible qualities? {198}
.
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