But I, who understand by those words the things I see and
feel, am obliged to think like other folks. And, as I am no
sceptic with regard to the nature of things, so neither am I as
to their existence. That a thing should be really perceived by my
senses, and at the same time not really exist, is to me a plain
contradiction; since I cannot prescind or abstract, even in
thought, the existence of a sensible thing from its being
perceived. Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like
things, which I name and discourse of, are things that I know.
And I should not have known them but that I perceived them by my
senses; and things perceived by the senses are immediately
perceived; and things immediately perceived are ideas; and ideas
cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore consists
in being perceived; when, therefore, they are actually perceived
there can be no doubt of their existence. Away then with all that
scepticism, all those ridiculous philosophical doubts. What a
jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of
sensible things, till he hath it proved to him from the veracity
of God; or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of
intuition or demonstration! I might as well doubt of my own
being, as of the being of those things I actually see and feel.
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