That
there is no substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to
me evident. And that the objects immediately perceived are ideas,
is on all hands agreed. And that sensible qualities are objects
immediately perceived no one can deny. It is therefore evident
there can be no
of those qualities but spirit; in
which they exist, not by way of mode or property, but as a thing
perceived in that which perceives it. I deny therefore that there
is - of the objects of sense, and that acceptation> that there is any material substance. But if by
is meant only , which
is seen and felt (and the unphilosophical part of the world, I
dare say, mean no more) -- then I am more certain of matter's
existence than you or any other philosopher pretend to be. If
there be anything which makes ,die generality of mankind {238}
averse from the notions I espouse, it is a misapprehension that I
deny the reality of sensible things. But, as it is you who are
guilty of that, and not 1, it follows that in truth their
aversion is against your notions and not mine.
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