Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same
object that we feel; neither is the same object perceived by the
microscope which was by the naked eye. But, in case every
variation was thought sufficient to constitute a new kind of
individual, the endless number of confusion of names would render
language impracticable. Therefore, to avoid this, as well as
other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought, men
combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or
by the same sense at different times, or in different
circumstances, but observed, however, to have some connexion in
nature, either with respect to co-existence or succession; all
which they refer to one name, and consider as one thing. Hence it
follows that when I examine, by my other senses, a thing I have
seen, it is not in order to understand better the same object
which I had perceived by sight, the object of one sense not being
perceived by the other senses. And, when I look through a
microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I
perceived already with my bare eyes; the object perceived by the
glass being quite different from the former.
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