You should
consider, in each particular, whether the difficulty arises from
the
-. If it doth not, you might as
well argue from the infinite divisibility of extension against
the Divine prescience, as from such a difficulty against
. And yet, upon recollection, I believe you will
find this to have been often, if not always, the case. You should
likewise take heed not to argue on a . One is
apt to say -- The unknown substances ought to be esteemed real
things, rather than the ideas in our minds: and who can tell but
the unthinking external substance may concur, as a cause or
instrument, in the productions of our ideas? But is not this
proceeding on a supposition that there are such external
substances? And to suppose this, is it not begging the question?
But, above all things, you should beware of imposing on yourself
by that vulgar sophism which is called . You
talked often as if you thought I maintained the non-existence of
Sensible Things.
Pages:
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191