How then does he remember what is not present? One might
as well suppose it possible also to see or hear that which is not
present. In reply, we suggest that this very thing is quite
conceivable, nay, actually occurs in experience. A picture painted
on a panel is at once a picture and a likeness: that is, while one and
the same, it is both of these, although the 'being' of both is not the
same, and one may contemplate it either as a picture, or as a
likeness. Just in the same way we have to conceive that the mnemonic
presentation within us is something which by itself is merely an
object of contemplation, while, in-relation to something else, it is
also a presentation of that other thing. In so far as it is regarded
in itself, it is only an object of contemplation, or a presentation;
but when considered as relative to something else, e.g. as its
likeness, it is also a mnemonic token. Hence, whenever the residual
sensory process implied by it is actualized in consciousness, if the
soul perceives this in so far as it is something absolute, it
appears to occur as a mere thought or presentation; but if the soul
perceives it qua related to something else, then,-just as when one
contemplates the painting in the picture as being a likeness, and
without having (at the moment) seen the actual Koriskos,
contemplates it as a likeness of Koriskos, and in that case the
experience involved in this contemplation of it (as relative) is
different from what one has when he contemplates it simply as a
painted figure-(so in the case of memory we have the analogous
difference for), of the objects in the soul, the one (the unrelated
object) presents itself simply as a thought, but the other (the
related object) just because, as in the painting, it is a likeness,
presents itself as a mnemonic token.
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