e. ta katholou) which are properly
objects of scientific knowledge); but to remember, strictly and
properly speaking, is an activity which will not be immanent until the
original experience has undergone lapse of time. For one remembers now
what one saw or otherwise experienced formerly; the moment of the
original experience and the moment of the memory of it are never
identical.
Again, (even when time has elapsed, and one can be said really to
have acquired memory, this is not necessarily recollection, for
firstly) it is obviously possible, without any present act of
recollection, to remember as a continued consequence of the original
perception or other experience; whereas when (after an interval of
obliviscence) one recovers some scientific knowledge which he had
before, or some perception, or some other experience, the state of
which we above declared to be memory, it is then, and then only,
that this recovery may amount to a recollection of any of the things
aforesaid. But, (though as observed above, remembering does not
necessarily imply recollecting), recollecting always implies
remembering, and actualized memory follows (upon the successful act of
recollecting).
But secondly, even the assertion that recollection is the
reinstatement in consciousness of something which was there before but
had disappeared requires qualification.
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