"
He did not assume the probability of war. Before we left he asked me
whether I had seen a certain number of the _Richmond Enquirer._ I said
that I had not. He sent for it, and gave it to me with the request
that I should return it after reading the leading editorial. The
editorial was upon Mr. Seward, and it was written upon the theory that
he was engaged in a scheme for delaying definite action in Virginia
and the other States of the South, until the inauguration of Mr.
Lincoln, when he would use both whip and spur. From the conversation
and the editorial I inferred that he intended to have me understand
that such was his purpose. It is possible he may have thought that war
could be averted by dilatory proceedings.
When the report of the Committee of Thirteen was made, the border State
men had high hopes that the country, both North and South, would accept
its recommendations. In truth, there was no ground for believing that
the Secessionists or the anti-slavery Republicans, would accept the
propositions. The recommendations were more offensive to the North
than the original constitution, with all the compromise legislation,
considered together.
I think that there were five speeches made in support of the
resolutions before a speech was made in opposition, and it fell to me
to make that speech.
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